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STRAIGHTJACKETING PROFESSIONALISM:
A COMMENT ON RUSSELL

David B. Wilkins*

Professor Russell's essay1 sounds a much needed cautionary
note about the public's characterization of Christopher Darden and
Johnnie Cochran both during and after the spectacle of O.J.
Simpson's criminal trial. Russell cogently argues that Darden and
Cochran's choices, as well as those of other black lawyers con
fronting similar problems,2 must be evaluated against the backdrop
of racism that devalues and constrains the lives of African Ameri
cans in general and African-American lawyers in particular.3 Black
lawyers, Russell insists, not only face "glass ceilings" inhibiting their
advancement, but must also live inside "glass bubble[s] . .. that se
verely circumscribe[ ] the flexibility and creativity so critical to the
Black lawyer's -or indeed any lawyer's -professional identity."4
Given continuing racism and the difficulties associated with be
ing a "token," Russell argues that branding black attorneys such as
Darden and Cochran as either "sellouts" or reckless opportunists
who "play the race card" saddles African-American lawyers with
problems "essentially not of their creation."5 In addition, she as
serts that employing these tropes perpetuates a false dichotomy be
tween, on the one hand, "raising racism as an issue," and, on the
other, "claiming the irrelevance of race."6 This false conflict,
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Director of the Program on the Legal Profes
sion, Harvard University. A.B. 1977, J.D. 1980, Harvard. - Ed. Erin Edmonds provided
invaluable research and editorial assistance. I am particularly grateful to Jay D. Edmonds, Jr.
for his insightful comments regarding several of the evidentiary and lawyering issues dis
cussed in this comment.

1. Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the
Straightjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REv. 766 (1997).
2. Like Professor Russell, I too limit my discussion of "representing race" to the exper
iences of black lawyers. See id. at 771 & n.19. For reasons upon which I elaborate more fully
elsewhere, differences between the experiences and commitments of black lawyers and those
of lawyers from other racial minority groups render problematic the kind of broad general
izations about "minority" lawyers that are often made in popular and scholarly literature.
See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate
Law Firms: An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493, 501 n.12 (1996).
3.

See Russell, supra note

1, at 769-71.

4. Id. at 772. For one attempt to chronicle the "glass ceiling" facing black lawyers, see
Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 2, at 568-84.
5. Russell,

supra note

1, at 772.

6. Id. at 773. Russell offers several reasons why this dichotomy is false. See id. at 773-75.
Although I am not sure that her arguments prove that the choice between "raising race as an
issue" and "claiming the irrelevance of race" is "false" in the sense that there is not a real
choice between these two strategies, the gist of her claim is nevertheless powerful: there
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Russell concludes, reinforces racial hierarchy by "accentuat[ing] in
traracial conflict."7 More important, it deprives black attorneys of
the "critically-needed latitude" they need to begin to explore "com
plex questions of legal professionalism, ethics, community identifi
cation, race-conscious lawyering strategies, or political agenda
formation."8

I share Russell's intuition. Discussions of the "Darden Di
lemma" and the "Cochran Conundrum" must account for the man
ner in which racism first constrained the choices these two men
faced, and then shaped the public's perception of their actions. I
also believe that inattention to this broader racial context inhibits
our ability to explore what it means to "represent race" in ways that
avoid the duality of "sellouts" and "race cards." What follows,
therefore, is more about scope, emphasis, and tone, than critique.
I believe that in order to reach a comprehensive understanding
of what it means to "represent race," either in the Simpson case or
generally, we must take up an aspect of the problem that Russell
expressly sets aside: the merits.9 By "merits," I mean both the
strengths and weaknesses of the case against Simpson, and the legit
imate professional obligations that Darden and Cochran assumed
by virtue of their respective roles as prosecutor and defense lawyer.
Black lawyers do not simply, because they are black, "represent
race." As lawyers, they also represent clients and the goals and val
ues of the legal system as a whole. If we are, in Professor Russell's
telling words, to treat black lawyers "not as racial icons, but as real
life, three-dimensional human beings,"10 we must take these profes
sional obligations seriously when discussing the extent to which Af
rican-American lawyers can or should "represent race."
In the balance of this Comment, I suggest how Russell's deci
sion to set aside the merits of Darden's and Cochran's arguments
clouds her analysis of both the Darden Dilemma and the Cochran
Conundrum. I begin, however, by exploring why placing too much
emphasis on what Russell refers to as the "master narrative"ll of
race runs the risk of reinforcing the very essentialism that Russell
rightly notes has been too often the bane of the black bar.
ought to be ways to discuss race that neither deny its significance nor make illegitimate the
use of racial sentiment.
7. Id. at 794.

Id.
9. See id. at 774-75 ("[T]his is not an essay about the merits of the Simpson case, nor
8.

about the personal characters or legal talents of Christopher Darden and Johnnie Cochran."
(footnote omitted)); id. at 790 ("As emphasized from the outset, my focus is neither the
substance of the Simpson prosecution itself nor the relative merits of individual lawyering
strategies in the context of that case.").
10. Id. at 774.
11. Id. at 774 n.23.
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Russell accurately depicts the many obstacles facing black law
yers. These barriers should not be minimized. The small number of
blacks in the profession, particularly in the upper echelons, assures
that African-American lawyers will confront daily all of the
problems associated with being a token: heightened visibility and a
corresponding pressure to perform (including pressure to be a "role
model" for other black lawyers), isolation from formal and informal
networks ,of power, and pressures to assimilate to prevailing
norms.12 At the same time, study after study confirms that race bias
continues to infect virtually every aspect of the American legal
system.13
This bias doubly affects black lawyers. First, as Russell empha
sizes, there are the long-term debilitating consequences of the con
stant barrage of insults, slights, and innuendoes that disparage black
lawyers' professional standing and competence.14 Equally, if not
more important, however, is the effect that racial bias in the legal
system has on the welfare (and therefore on the choices) of clients.
Black clients, who bear the brunt of the legal system's racism, may
find it more difficult to secure justice if they hire a black lawyer.
White clients may also be less likely to engage the services of a
black lawyer if they are concerned that he or she will not be taken
seriously by other important actors in the system.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to assume that race completely
dominates the professional lives of black lawyers. Russell asserts
that "[a]ttomeys of color often find that they ar.e identified, catego
rized, and evaluated first as members of their racial group, and only
secondarily as lawyers."15 As a descriptive matter, this statement
overstates the effect of race in the lives of most black lawyers. The
majority of black lawyers today practice as their predecessors did a
generation ago: in solo practice or in small minority firms repre
senting predominately black clients.16 Racism undoubtedly helps to
12. In 1990, blacks comprised just over three percent of the nation's lawyers. See AN
DREW HACKER, Two NATIO NS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HosTILE, UNEQUAL 111
(1992). On the problems associated with being a token, see RosABETH Moss KANTER, MEN
AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 210-12 (1977) (discussing the problems of tokenism). I
discuss the implications of Kanter's work for black lawyers in corporate law firms in Wilkins
& Gulati, supra note 2, at 571-72.
13. See Suellyn Scarnecchia, State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and Ethnic
Bias in the Courts, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 923 (1993) (discussing fifteen task force reports

confirming race and ethnic bias in the courts).

14. See Russell, supra note 1, at 769-70.
15. Id. at 767.
16. Given the dearth of accurate empirical information on

the black bar, it is impossible
to say with certainty where the majority of black lawyers are currently employed. Neverthe
less, given the small number of blacks in large firms and other elite areas of corporate prac
tice, together with the large percentage of the bar as a whole that remains in solo and small
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confine these lawyers to the lower echelons of the bar. Neverthe
less, it seems likely that in their daily interactions with clients and, more important, in their understanding of themselves - these
black women and men view their professional identity as lawyers as
being at least as important as their racial identity.
Even blacks who practice in more rarefied climates should not
forget that, despite all of the debilitating insults and slights,17 their
professional status still carries considerable weight. Most of the
time, the bailiff shows the lawyer to the counsel table; the recep
tionist takes the lawyer's coat and asks if she wants a cup of coffee;
the paralegal stays up all night to finish the memo; the cab stops;
and the shop door is buzzed open.1s More important, when these
courtesies are not accorded, black lawyers frequently have the abil
ity to take corrective action, to impose their professional status on
an admittedly recalcitrant world.
The point here is not to minimize the degrading, long-term ef
fects of not being accorded the normal privileges of professional
standing. However, failing to acknowledge the degree to which a
black lawyer's professional status acts as a partial buffer against
many of the most pernicious effects of racism also has its costs. To
assert as a factual m�tter that race is the dominant feature in the
lives of black lawyers is to run the risk of equating the difficulties of
black middle class status with the far more pressing problems faced
by poor blacks.19
Normatively, positing race as the dominant feature of a black
lawyer's identity is even mor� troubling. Black lawyers are lawyers
regardless of whether white America always is prepared to accept
them as such. This professional status carries with it unique duties
and responsibilities. Lawyers, for example, are obligated to keep
client confidences in circumstances where ordinary citizens might
have a moral (or even a legal) duty to disclose.20 When a lawyer
agrees to represent a client, she is ethically obligated to defend her
firm practice, it is reasonable to surmise that most black lawyers continue to practice in these
traditional settings. Cf. David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop: The Role of Legal
Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1983
n.11 (1993) (noting that reports on the number of black lawyers entering corporate practice
are exaggerated).
17.

See Russell, supra note

1, at 769 n.10.

18. Cf. id. at 770 (noting that minorities in the legal profession report being "sized up"
according to their color, rather than their professional status).
19. Russell is well aware of this danger. See id. at 770 n.16 {"What, one wonders, do
these anecdotes reveal about assumptions made about the humanity of people of color who
could never afford to take cabs, shop at upscale stores, dine in swanky restaurants, or drive
BMWs?").
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (requiring a lawyer
to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client except under certain . narrowly drawn
circumstances).
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client's interests zealously within the bounds of the law.21 A lawyer
also has obligations to preserve and enhance the legal framework
that are different from - and arguably more capacious than - the
duties of ordinary citizeils.22
These duties carry moral weight. Like every other person who
decides to become a la'Wyer� a black man or woman entering the
legal profession voluntarily agrees to abide by the rules of legal eth
ics.23 The moral force of this voluntary commitment is reinforced
by the fact that other participants in the system - judges, opposing
lawyers, and, most of all, clients - reasonably rely on black lawyers
(as they rely on all lawyers) to abide by these professional commit
ments. The legal system could not function if it were otherwise.
These professional obligations are not rendered irrelevant by ra
cism. To imply that racism negates the moral force of a black law
yer's assumption of professional obligations is to deny these women
and men the very moral agency that the civil rights movement
rightly insists is their inalienable due. Nor is the American justice
system so riddled with racism that lawyers are excused from what
would otherwise be legitimate role obligations. Many would con
tend that lawyers in Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa h�d
no moral obligation to honor the professional norms. of these racist
regimes; indeed, they may have had an affirmative obligation to re
sist. Notwithstanding its many problems, however, the United
s tates is not such a regime.24 To be sure, the law has imposed sub.

21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983) (stating that an
attorney must "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalP'); see also L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the
Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 (1980) (discussing a lawyer's duty to clients).
22. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. l, 17 {1988)
(arguing that no plausible account of the democratic state can "manage without some notion
that lawyers must be committed to helping to maintain the legal framework"); David B.
Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to
Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269 {1996).
23. See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Soci
ety, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 984, 1003 & n.103 (1995) {documenting this requirement).

24. Even Professor Paul Butler concedes as much. Butler's recent proposal that black
jurors refuse to convict black defendants accused of nonviolent crimes constitutes one of the
sharpest attacks on the American criminal justice system. See Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
Even Butler, however, carefully couches his proposal for resistance by black jurors within the
existing norms regarding juries' power to nullify "unjust" laws and convictions. See id. at
708-09. Moreover, by conceding that jurors should not nullify the convictions of black of
fenders who are guilty of violent crimes, Butler implicitly acknowledges that the U.S. legal
system is tolerably just in at least these cases. The bottom line is that, as the brilliant 1970s
pop poet Gil Scott-Heron once said, "New York ain't like Johannesburg!" GIL Scorr
HERON, What's the Word/Johannesburg, on FROM SoUIH AFRICA TO S oUIH CAROLINA
(Arista Records 1975).
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stantial burdens on African Americans.25 It has also provided im
portant benefits, ones that have made possible the partial
flourishing of blacks in the United States.
As a result, although Russell may be correct that every case that
a black lawyer takes on is "at some level a 'race case,'"26 it is also
necessarily a professional case. Therefore, black lawyers cannot, as
Russell suggests, dispense with "the norms of mainstream legal
practice" in favor of "community-based reflection" when deciding
how to respond to ethical situations such as those that confronted
Darden and Cochran.27 The legal profession's "mainstream" norms
carry moral, not just practical, weight. They therefore constitute a
legitimate constraint on how a black lawyer should respond to the
fact that he or she is both representing race as well as representing

clients.
This does not mean that black lawyers must accept uncritically
prevailing ethical practices. Like other members of the profession,
black lawyers have the right - and indeed the duty - to question
the norms of "mainstream legal practice," and to seek to change
these prevailing understandings when they produce injustice. As I
argue elsewhere, African-American attorneys may have a particu
larly strong duty to seek change in cases where existing norms dis
advantage the black community.28 Nor are black lawyers required
to endorse the dominant view of what constitutes "mainstream
legal practice." Bar leaders frequently claim that no-holds-barred,
zealous advocacy is the only model of law practice consistent with
the legal profession's ideals and traditions. As William Simon
25. See ROBERT M. COVER, JusnCE Accus ED (1975) (documenting the contribution of
fugitive slave laws and other legal mechanisms to the oppression of blacks in the United
States).
26. Russell, supra note l, at 7f57. I take up the merits of this contention below.
note 59 and accompanying text.

See infra

27. See Russell, supra note 1, at 785 (arguing that black lawyers should seek to under
stand the legitimate concerns underlying the Darden Dilemma "through community-based
reflection, rather than through the norms of mainstream legal practice"). Russell does not
specify what she has in mind by "community-based reflection" other than to suggest that
"Black attorneys and Black communities" use the Darden Dilemma "as a basis for reconnec
tion and debate." Id. I agree that a dialogue between black lawyers and members of the
black community about issues such as the Darden Dilemma would help to clarify the compet
ing values at stake. My point is simply that any such dialogue would have to pay substantial
attention to the "mainstream norms of legal practice" that legitimately constrain the extent
to which black lawyers can and should represent race.
28. See David B. Wtlkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1040-43 (1995) [hereinafter
Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment]; DAVID B. WILKINS, Social Engineers or
Corporate Tools: Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of the Black Corporate
Bar, in RACE, LAW AND CuLTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter WILKINS, Social Engineers]; Wilkins, supra note 16, at 19952008.
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argues, this claim is demonstrably false.29 Consequently, in addi
tion to seeking actively to change the _norms of "mainstream legal
practice," black lawyers should maximize the opportunities for
race-conscious lawyering that are available within the bar's existing
ethical norms.30
Professor Russell's "Lesson From the Elders" section illustrates
nicely the danger of overlooking the legitimate constraints imposed
by professional roles.31 In the case she describes, Judge Higginbot
ham eloquently refused to recuse himself from a race discrimina
tion case involving a class of black employees. As Russell notes,
the crux of Higginbotham's argument is a rejection of the "defend
ant's tacit presumption that a Black judge posed a unique threat to
norms of judicial neutrality" simply because he or she may have
spoken out on issues of race or had a strong commitment to racial
justice.32 Put somewhat differently, Higginbotham merely de
manded to be accorded the same respect as any other judg� of any
color, who, in the name of judicial norms of impartiality and due
process, is presumed to be able to put away his or her personal
loyalties and rule on cases according to the evidence and the law.
Judge Higginbotham rightly viewed the claim that race some
how overwhelmed or supplanted his obligations to his professional
role as an affront to his human dignity as a free and equal moral
actor capable of honoring his chosen commitments. As we examine
the actions of Darden and Cochran, we must be careful to accord
them the same level of respect.

II. RACE AND RoLE:

BALANCING THE DILEMMAS AND
CONUNDRUMS OF LAWYERING IN A RACIALIZED
WORLD

Russell paints a vivid portrait of the external constraints that
brand black attorneys with either the "sellout" or the "race-card"
trope. White Americans are increasingly unsympathetic to claims
that race plays an important role in· the lives of black Americans.
The attitude that we have "gotten beyond" race is applied with spe
cial force to the law.
The belief that race talk has no place in the courtroom is mis
guided. To be sure, the legal system's formal commitment to "equal
29. See William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARYL. REv. 217
(1996) (arguing that the "dominant view" of legal ethics ignores important aspects of tradi
tional legal discourse).

30. See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 2023 (arguing that "the traditional model of legal ethics
is not as unyielding [to the claims of race-conscious lawyering] as many law school ethics
courses might lead one to believe").
31. See Russell, supra note 1, at 775-79.
32. Id. at 777.
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justice under the law" signals that race should not matter in assess
ing the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. In the face of
this commitment, arguments about race in the courtroom appear to
many whites to be out of place. This intuition, however, conflates
the legal system's commitment to the ideal of colorblind adjudica
tion with the factual assertion that this ideal has been met in prac
tice. As a result, attorneys are under pressure to suppress or deny
instances in which race affects the administration of justice. Those
who defy the pressure and bring race into the courtroom force
other participants in the proceedings and the public at large to con
front the discomforting extent to which the ideals of American jus
tice remain unfulfilled. Accusing these lawyers of "playing the race
card" is one way to deflect attention from this uncomfortable real
ity. As Russell eloquently describes, black attorneys are particu
larly vulnerable to this dynamic.33
Because she focuses exclusively on the limitations on race dis
course imposed by white society, however, Russell suggests that the
racial narratives embedded in the Darden Dilemma and the
Cochran Conundrum are identical. More important, because she
sets the merits of Darden's and Cochran's arguments to one side,
she leaves the impression that understanding this unitary racial nar
rative provides the key to unraveling these dilemmas and conun
drums. Both of these claims place too much emphasis on the
straightjacketing effect of white racism.

33. See id. at 771-72. Although Russell is undoubtedly correct to assert that black attor
neys face especially high barriers to bringing race into the courtroom, she understates the
extent to which this dynamic inhibits the discussion of race by all lawyers. See id. at 772
("Unlike white attorneys, who have the relatively luxurious comfort of invisibility and trans
parency in raising issues of race in the lawyering process, Black attorneys must always brace
themselves to have their racial, professional, and personal identities placed at issue as well."),
Experience suggests that white lawyers who attempt to focus attention on continuing racism
in the justice system frequently have their "professional" and "personal" identities - and
sometimes even their "racial" loyalties - called into question as well. Consider, for exam
ple, the constant barrage of attacks leveled against Wiiiiam Kunstler during his long and
illustrious career as a critic of the racism embedded in the legal system. See, e.g., Adam
Freedman, Book Review, NATL. REv., Dec. 31, 1994, at 65 (reviewing WILUAM KUNSTLER,
MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER (1994), and cataloguing criticisms against Kunstler). Signif
icantly, in one of his last cases Kunstler was criticized by members of the Jewish community
for representing the Arab defendants in the World Trade Center bombing case and sug
gesting that they were the victims of a racist prosecution. See David Margolick, Still Radical
After All These Years: At 74, William Kunst/er Defends Clients Most Lawyers Avoid, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 1993, at Bl. More generally, given that all lawyers face growing upheaval and
uncertainty in their professional lives, see, e.g., Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as
Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2025, 2046-52 {1993) {describing the way in
which many associates and partners of all races feel alienated from their jobs as lawyers), it is
important not to exaggerate the extent to which "the comforting sense of belonging or even
anonymity . . . attaches quite naturally to white lawyers." Russell, supra note 1, at 768. This is
another example of how blacks act as a bellwether for problems that pervade the legal pro
fession as a whole. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 2, at 613.
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Why Conundrums are More Risky Than Dilemmas

Russell argues that the Darden Dilemma, although "influenced
... and at times perhaps exacerbated by Black community critiques
. . . is inherently and inevitably a result of a legal system that deval
ues all Black lives."34 The root cause according to Russell, is the
extent to which "dominant popular discourse (even more than the
'Black community') pigeonholes [black lawyers who choose to work
in areas not typically associated with racial justice] with an array of
labels ('assimilationist,' 'colorblind,' 'mainstream,' 'conservative,'
[and] 'sellout')."35 Similarly, Russell maintains that although it was
Darden who first introduced the "race card" trope into the Simpson
trial, the genesis of this critique was the white community's anger
over Cochran's violation of a "social taboo [when he] render[ed]
painfully explicit the racial overtones that had suffused the [Simp
son] case from its inception."36 As a result, Russell concludes, the
problems faced by both Darden and Cochran are ultimately the re
sult of "racial attitudes and assumptions" beyond their - and their
community's - "understanding and control."37
This parallel construction obscures important differences be
tween the racial narratives embedded in these two cases. It is an
empirical question whether the critique of Darden or other black
lawyers who may be seen as working against the cause of racial jus
tice3s originated in the "dominant popular discourse" or in the
black community. However, given the general inattention to issues
of race that Russell so eloquently documents,39 it seems doubtful
that the white community created this conflict. It is hard to believe
that the average white American views a black prosecutor who up
holds the colorblind ideals of the justice system by putting black
criminals in jail as betraying his community. That thought, as the
passage from Paul Butler quoted by Russell attests,40 is much more
likely to have originated among blacks who are alarmed by the
34. Russell, supra note 1, at 784 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 782.
36. Id. at 791.
37. Id. at 793.
38. I want to emphasize the speculative and contingent nature of this charge. As Darden
himself argues, there are strong arguments that black prosecutors - either by watching out
for racism in the prosecutor's office, or by preventing criminals (black and white) from prey
ing on the black community - promote the cause of racial justice. See id. at 780 (quoting
Darden). I make a similar claim on behalf of blacks who go into corporate law practice. See
Wilkins, supra note 16.
39. See Russell, supra note 1, at 770 (noting the dearth of scholarship on the effect of race
on legal practice).
40. See id. at 783 (quoting Butler as reporting that " 'some of my fellow African-Ameri
can prosecutors hoped that [Marion Barry] would be acquitted, despite the fact that he was
obviously guilty of at least one of the charges' " because they believed " 'that the prosecution
of Barry was racist' ").
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growing number of African-American men involved with the crimi
nal justice system.
To be sure, the popular press has picked up and exploited the
controversy over Darden for its own purposes. Much of this litera
ture, however, treats the Darden Dilemma not so much as a di
lemma, but as another example of some blacks attempting to play
the race card on other blacks.41 Blacks who are portrayed as being
willing to brave the wrath of their "brothers and sisters" in the
name of upholding "universal" commitments like putting guilty
people in jail are generally valorized by mainstream popular dis
course.42 This sentiment helps to explain Darden's somewhat sur
prising popularity, particularly among whites.43 To the extent that
the Darden Dilemma is perceived as a real dilemma, therefore, it is
primarily because of the sentiments of certain sectors of the black
community.44
By contrast, the Cochran Conundrum, as Russell persuasively
demonstrates, was essentially created - and certainly has been per
petuated - by whites angry over Simpson's acquittal. Darden may
have been the first person to accuse Cochran of "playing the race
card,"45 but it was not until Robert Shapiro made his now infamous
statement to Barbara Walters that the charge gained national cur
rency. More important, it has been whites, both in the media and
elsewhere, who have lodged the most vociferous objections to the
41. For example, consider the following statement by a white journalist quoted by Rus
sell: "The truth is that, along with using race as a blunt instrument against whites, blacks use
it to craft relations with one another." Bill Maxwell, Intraracism Snares Chris Darden, Aruz.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1995, at BS, quoted in Russell, supra note 1, at 788 n.59. Although Max
well goes on to chastise Cochran for "playing the race card," the headline makes clear that
the author's charge of "intraracism" would also apply to the claim that Darden had sold out
the black community by prosecuting Simpson.
42. See Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment, supra note 28, at 1065-66 (dis
cussing the public acclaim given to a black lawyer who represented the Ku Klux Klan);
Adolph Reed, Jr., Steele Trap, THE NATION, Mar. 4, 1991, at 274 (book review) (noting the
unjustified public praise of Shelby Steele). Russell recognizes this phenomenon. See Russell,
supra note 1, at 784 (noting "the token Black attorneys [the white community] ostensibly
valorizes as the honored few"). She does not, however, explain how this fact influences the
construction of the Darden Dilemma.
43. It is interesting that Darden generally is treated as something of a hero (or at least a
tragic figure) by the press even though many in the media and elsewhere believe that the
prosecution of which he was a prominent part botched the Simpson case.

44. It is important to remember that many in the black community want more - not less
- prosecution of the criminals (most of whom are black) who prey upon their neighbor
hoods. Thus, recent polls found that 82% of blacks surveyed favored harsher treatment of
criminals by courts in their communities. Seventy six percent favored putting more police on
the streets, and 68% favored building more prisons. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, at 172, 174-75,
178 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995) (summarizing poll data). These data
underline the difficulty of making blanket statements about the views of the "black
community."
45. I return to Darden's use of this trope below.
text.

See infra notes 77-78 and

accompanying
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two examples most closely associated with this charge: the intro
duction of Mark Fuhrman's racism as a central element in the case,
and Cochran's appeal to jurors to "send a message" about police
misconduct during his closing argument.46
This difference between the racial narratives encoded in the
Darden Dilemma and the Cochran Conundrum - the former re
flecting ambivalence by certain sectors of the black community
about the long-term effect of black prosecutors' helping to put
more young black men in jail; the latter evidencing the white com
munity's fear that blacks will invoke race to undermine the legiti
mate goals of the justice system (or even, more radically, to expose
the illegitimate privilege enjoyed by whites in the justice system) has important consequences for how black attorneys are likely to
resolve these issues. As Darden's anguished testimony makes clear,
the black community is not without sanctions to enforce its under
standing of how black prosecutors, and more generally black law
yers, should balance their competing obligations to the black
community and their professional role.47 For many black attorneys,
their ties to their community are important sources of strength and
well-being.48 To the extent that these lawyers perceive that the
black community disapproves of certain .lawyering roles or particu
lar actions, they may be less likely to follow that particular path.
Conversely, the chance to gamer community approval (or indeed
adulation) may induce some black attorneys to assume lawyering
roles or actions - for example, becoming a civil rights lawyer,
charging officials with racism, or actively appealing to racial solidar
ity - that they otherwise would not be inclined to pursue were it
not for the. support or encouragement of the black community.
This pressure, although substantial, is of a different order of
magnitude compared with the pressures on black lawyers generated
by the larger society. As Russell tellingly portrays, black lawyers
who bring race into the courtroom face severe sanctions, including
public vilification, loss of professional standing, and, in extreme
cases, financial ruin.49 By the same token, blacks who conform to
the expectations of the white community - either by pursuing ca
reers in mainstream fields such as corporate practice, or by openly
defying the perceived or express wishes of other blacks - often
receive substantial rewards. Careers in the mainstream hold out
46.

See Russell, supra note

1, at 789 n.60.

47. See id. at 780 (noting Darden's "justifiable torment over his apparent ostracism from
some in the Black community").
48.

See Wilkins, supra note

16, at 1999-2000.

49. See Russell, supra note 1, at 788-93. Although Cochran certainly has not been ruined
by the sharp reaction to some of his actions in the Simpson case, it is likely that his efforts to
build an institutional client base for his law firm have been hampered by charges that he
played the race card.
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the promise of all of the money and status traditionally flowing to
those in proximity to wealth and power.50 As I indicated above,
criticizing other blacks also has been known to improve the profes
sional standing and personal wealth of those blacks perceived as
willing to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy within the black
community.51
·

This asymmetry between the pressures emanating from the
black and white communities on matters of race politics is likely to
affect the distribution of black lawyers who are willing to take on
the troubles associated with one or the other of these lawyering
strategies. It is doubtful that one could ever prove this intuition.
Nevertheless, the growing number of black lawyers moving into
mainstream areas of legal practice, combined with the unease that
many African-American attorneys express about raising issues of
race in their professional roles, suggests that the pressures and re
wards associated with conformity are likely to dwarf those con
nected with racial solidarity.s2
Simply noting that black lawyers face greater pressure to avoid
conundrums than dilemmas, however, does not tell us whether we
should view this trend with alarm.53 It is possible that the white
community's critique of black lawyers who play the race card is
more legitimate than the black community's objection to African
American prosecutors who seek to put black defendants behind
bars. Although race may frame the lens through which both the
dilemma and the conundrum are constructed, it cannot by itself
provide the answer to the normative question of how these two
quandaries should be handled by black lawyers. To reach that de
termination, we must once again return to the merits of Darden's
and Cochran's positions and the legitimate constraining effects of
their respective professional roles.
50. See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 1991 (discussing the benefits black lawyers receive from
corporate practice). Needless to say, these rewards are not always realized in practice. See
Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 2, at 568-84 (noting the problems faced by black lawyers in
corporate law firms).
51.

See supra note

42 and accompanying text.

52. On the trend towards blacks entering mainstream legal practice, see Wilkins, supra
note 16, at 1982-83. On the pressure not to discuss race in professional settings, see id. at
2015. See also Russell, supra note 1, at 791-92 (noting "the far-reaching animus with which
explicitly antiracist, race-conscious critiques are met in a variety of contexts").
53. The fact that black lawyers face greater pressures to avoid the Cochran Conundrum
than the Darden Dilemma does not mean necessarily that black attorneys will act in accord
ance with these incentives. In other words, it is not clear that fewer black lawyers will be
willing to raise racial issues explicitly - and risk being accused of playing the race card than will be prepared to take positions that some blacks might view as being contrary to the
interests of the black community - and risk being labeled sellouts. For example, the fact
that many blacks enter the legal profession with the express goal of using their legal skills to
improve the plight of the black community may make many more African-American attor
neys willing to take on the risks associated with the Cochran Conundrum than one might
otherwise expect.
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Race and the Adversary System

In addition to being black men, both Darden and Cochran are,
of course, lawyers. As I argued in Part I, this simple truth creates
an additional set of obligations that each man must take into ac
count in deciding the extent to which, as a black man, he inevitably
"represents race." Moreover, both men occupied particular roles in
the Simpson case - prosecutor and defense lawyer -that created
their own unique obligations and commitments. Understanding
these professional ,roles and obligations is essential to reaching a
normative judgment about how each man resolved his respective
dilemma or conundrum.

1.

Reconceptualizing the Darden Dilemma: When Race
Shouldn't Matter

Russell frames the Darden Dilemma in, terms of the "[f]allacy of
'[c]olorblind' [l]awyering."54 This framing seems natural in light of
the constant rhetoric emanating from the prosecutors that race was
not an issue in the Simpson case.55 To the extent that Gil Garcetti
and others may have intended this statement to mean that race was
irrelevant to the case, it was flatly false. Long before Mark Fuhr
man's racism or the composition of the jury surfaced as issues in the
case, the simple fact that a black man was accused of murdering his
white (blonde, no less) former wife (along with her handsome white
male companion) ensured that the perceptions and actions of at
least some people both inside and outside the justice system would
be influenced by race.
Nevertheless, as Russell acknowledges, the prosecution could
legitimately have asserted that (to the best of their knowledge) race
played no appreciable role in the initiation of the prosecution.56
Nor, they could have argued, should it have affected the outcome of
the case.57 Our legal system is committed to the principle that
neither the defendant's race nor the race of the victims should mat
ter when assessing a defendant's guilt or innocence. As "officers of
the court," both prosecutors and defense lawyers ought to view
themselves as committed to this fundamental aspirational norm.58
54. Russell, supra note 1, at 785.
55. See id. at 786.
56. See id.·
57. See id. at 785.
58. Nor is there any compelling moral reason for either man to reject this fundamental
aspirational goal. Unless one is willing to argue that race actually affects the moral worth of
human beings - a position that to my knowledge no critical race theorist accepts - skin
color should have no bearing on our determination of whether Simpson committed this terri
ble crime.
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Darden's commitment to the aspiration that race should not af
fect the outcome of the Simpson prosecution does not necessarily
commit him to what Russell refers to as the ideology of colorblind
lawyering. The claim that race ought not to make a difference in
cases of this kind59 is not the same as the assertion that race does
not make a difference in particular instances. Sometimes, to honor
the ideal that race should not matter in assessing the defendant's
guilt, we must look expressly at how racial stereotypes and biases
might affect the actual or perceived fairness of the process.
Notwithstanding their repeated invocation of the "race is irrele
vant" mantra, the prosecution frequently pursued a race-conscious
strategy designed - when viewed in its best light - to protect the
ultimate goal of race-neutral decisionmaking. Consider, for exam
ple, Garcetti's decision to bring the Simpson prosecution in L.A.
County (where there probably would be many black jurors) as op
posed to Santa Monica County (where the jury would be mostly
white). Russell characterizes this decision as a hypocritical ac
knowledgment of the fallacy of colorblind lawyering.6 0
There is, however, a more benign interpretation.61 Three hun
dred years of demonizing black male sexuality has left its mark on
the consciousness of many whites, particularly in cases involving
white women.62 At the same time, the acquittal by an all-white jury
in Simi Valley of four white police officers accused of beating
Rodney King left many black Angelenos (and blacks elsewhere)
with a deep suspicion about the fairness of trying racially sensitive
cases before all-white juries. Given these factors, it was certainly
plausible for Garcetti to believe that trying the case in L.A. County
would emphasize the legal system's commitment - in practice, not
59. There are, of course, cases in which race ought to make a difference (e.g., discrimina
tion and hate crime cases). This distinction underscores the danger of referring to all cases in
which there is at least one black participant as a "race case," regardless of the particular
manner in which race either will or should become a factor in the case. See id. at 7'07 (argu
ing that "every case argued by a Black attorney is at some level a 'race case' ").
60. See id. at 786 & n.56 (quoting Brent Staples as accusing Garcetti of playing the race
card by bringing the case in L.A. County).
61. By constructing an interpretation of Garcetti's actions that is consistent with the fun
damental ideal that race should not affect the determination of Simpson's guilt, I do not
mean to suggest that this was Garcetti's actual motivation. As a politician - and a skillful
one at that - Garcetti's motives were undoubtedly mixed. Indeed, it may very well be true
that he was concerned more with avoiding civil unrest after a potential Simpson conviction
than in ensuring that Simpson received a fair trial. Nevertheless, the fact that his actions are
consistent with promoting the ideals of the justice system is relevant to understanding what
Garcetti - and more important, Darden - meant when they asserted that race was not a
factor in the Simpson prosecution.
62. For an excellent survey of the historical roots and continuing effects of myths about
black male sexuality, see Erin Edmonds, Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White
Feminist Perspective on the Enforcement of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETIER J. 43, 49-67
(1992).
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just in theory - to the norm that race should not affect the assess
ment of Simpson's guilt.63
One can make a similar argument concerning Garcetti's deci
sion to add Darden to the prosecution team. The timing of
Darden's appointment certainly raised a strong suspicion that
Darden was added to the team in part for racial reasons.64 At the
time that Garcetti made this decision, it was already evident that
the defense was going to raise serious allegations of police miscon
duct. Unfortunately, there is a long history of official bias and cor
ruption in cases involving black defendants accused of raping or
murdering white women.6s Once again, given this history, it is plau
sible that adding a black prosecutor to the Simpson team - partic
ularly one with a demonstrated commitment toward uncovering
and prosecuting police misconduct66 - would make it more likely
that race would not affect the determination of Simpson's guilt.
The strength of the claim that these race-conscious lawyering
decisions will promote the legal system's commitment to the ideal
of colorblind decisionmaking depends upon these black participants
honoring their institutional commitment not to inject race into the
proceedings illegitimately. Black jurors are expected to bring their
experience with, and ability to uncover, racism with them into the
jury room.67 They must not, however, ignore their sworn role
specific commitment to the ideal of race-neutral decisionmaking by
allowing racial sentiment to influence their determination of Simp
son's guilt or innocence. For his part, Darden promotes the ideal of
race-neutral decisionmaking when he pays particular attention to
issues of race that might adversely affect the trial process. In order
63. It is important to emphasize that this intuition need not rest on any essentialist claims
about the "fairness" of black jurors. Rather, as a contingent historical fact, it is reasonable to
believe that, on average, black jurors are more likely to be sensitive to the power of racial
stereotypes regarding black men and white women.
64. See Russell, supra note 1, at 779-80. Below, I consider whether Cochran should have
leveled this charge. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
65. See Edmonds, supra note 62, at 61-62 (noting a variety of injustices in cases involving
black men accused of raping or murdering white women).
66. See Russell, supra note 1, at 779-80 (noting that "in his pre-Simpson prosecutorial
career, [Darden] devoted considerable energies to investigating and prosecuting racist and
other lawless behavior in the Los Angeles Police Department").
67. The fact that, because of their upbringing and experience, there are good reasons for
believing that black jurors will be especially sensitive to these issues should not be inter
preted as Jetting white jurors off the hook. Tney too have an ethical obligation to uncover
and punish racist practices. Failing to note this simple truth leads to the perverse conclusion
that the victims of racism have a greater obligation to fight this injustice than do those who
are the system's beneficiaries (whether intentional or not). See Amy Gutmann, Responding
to Racial Injustice, in COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POUTICAL MORALITY OF RACE 169-70 (K.
Anthony Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds., 1996). Whatever one thinks of Paul Butler's contro
versial claim that racism in the administration of justice provides a legitimate reason for
black jurors to nullify the convictions of nonviolent black offenders, by failing to urge white
jurors to adopt this policy, Butler has fallen into this trap. See Butler, supra note 24.
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not to undermine the ideal, however, he must also uphold the same
basic level of commitment to the state's case that one would expect
of someone who was not also charged with "representing race."
Contrary to what Russell suggests, respecting these role-generated
obligations requires someone in Darden's position to argue that
race "should be characterized as irrelevant to a particular context,
even if it has been otherwise raised in the proceedings. "68
For the most part, I believe that Darden maintained this delicate
balance.69 Far from espousing the ideology of "colorblindness,"
Darden did his best, within the confines of his professional role as
Russell, supra note 1, at 786 (emphasis added).
For what it is worth, I also believe that the black members of the jury upheld their
role-specific obligation and acquitted Simpson on the basis of reasonable doubt, not racial
sentiment. The subsequent finding of liability assessed against Simpson in the civil wrongful
death suit actually reinforces - rather than undermines - this conclusion. There are several
plausible explanations for the different verdicts in the criminal and civil cases.
The most obvious explanation is the difference in burdens of persuasion: "beyond a rea
sonable doubt" in the criminal case compared with "preponderance of the evidence" in the
civil suit. Following the civil verdict, at least one juror from each of the two juries stated
publicly that, had she been sitting on the other jury with its burden of persuasion, she would
have reached the opposite conclusion. The civil juror would have voted to acquit Simpson,
and the criminal juror would have voted to find him liable. "[Lisa Michelle] Theriot [a juror
in the civil case] said although she believed the plaintiffs had proved Simpson liable by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . she did not think they had shown beyond a reasonable
doubt that he killed tiJe two victims." Peter Fimrite & Reynolds Holding, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al. "A white woman who served on the jury that acquitted
Simpson in his criminal trial says she's delighted with yesterday's civil court verdict against
the football legend. Anise Aschenbach tells the L.A. Times that she thought all along Simp
son was guilty. She says she went along with the decision to acquit because of the require
ment in a criminal trial that a case be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." City News Service
of Los Angeles, Inc., February 5, 1997; see also Abigail Goldman & Mary Curtius, Simpson
Civil Case; For Many, It's As Simple as Black and White; Reaction: As With the First Trial,
Public Opinions Often Follow Racial Lines. But African Americans Display a Greater Sense
of Inevitability About New Verdicts, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A14.
Moreover, the civil jury had access to two additional pieces of evidence - Simpson's
testimony and the pictures of Simpson apparently wearing the now-infamous Bruno Magli
shoes - that were unavailable to jurors in the criminal case. Press accounts report that
following the introduction of this new evidence, the gap between the number of blacks and
whites who believed that Simpson committed the murders narrowed appreciably. See Peter
S. Canellos, Gap Over Simpson Narrows: More Blacks, Whites Seen Doubting His Credibil
ity, BosroN GLOBE, Jan. 25, 1997, at Al.
Finally, it is worth noting that by awarding punitive damages in an amount substantially
greater than the plaintiffs' estimation of Simpson's net worth, a strong case can be made that
the civil jury blatantly disregarded California law - and the judge's corresponding instruc
tions - regarding how these damages should be assessed. See, e.g., David Segal, Verdict Stirs
Debate on Punitive Awards; Lawyers Split on Whether Judge Will ·Reduce $33.5 Million in
Damages, WASH. Posr, Feb. 12, 1997, at A4 ("[o]thers believe the jury's punishment would
wipe out Simpson financially, an eventuality that California guidelines seek to prevent
'Even though the award is supposed to sting enough to deter, you're not supposed to bank
rupt a defendant,' said Paul Rothstein, a professor at Georgetown University Law School.
'These damages might be considered excessive simply because they exceed the plaintiffs' bot
tom-line conclusions about Simpson's net worth.' ") The fact that this clear derogation of the
(nearly all-white) civil jury's duty to follow the law has produced only a small fraction of the
outrage in the popular and legal press that was visited on the (nearly all-black) jury in the
criminal case provides further support for Russell's basic thesis that, when it comes to the
public's reaction to the developments in the Simpson case, race matters.
68.

69.

.

•

•

•
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the representative of the state, to uphold the institutional norm that
race should not influence the determination of Simpson's guilt or
innocence. The now infamous N-word exchange between Darden
and Cochran70 illustrates the balance Darden attempted to strike.
Russell is ambiguous as to whether she views Darden's argu
ment regarding evidence of Fuhrman's past use of the N-word as an
example of Darden's approach to colorblind lawyering or as an il
lustration of Darden's inability to stick to this strategy.71 In my
judgment, however, it was neither. Darden's argument for exclud
ing Fuhrman's past racist statements was expressly color conscious.
It called on his personal experience with race as a means of con
vincing a judge, arguably unfamiliar with the d,ebilitating effects of
this particular epithet, about the probable impact on black jurors of
allowing it to be injected into the trial.72 In essence, Darden argued
that in order to prevent race from infecting the process, this explicit
mention of race must be excluded.
On the merits, this was a plausible, although certainly not deci
sive, argument.73 Exposing Fuhrman as a racist could easily have
made it more difficult for black jurors to evaluate his testimony ob
jectively. Moreover, the rules of evidence appear to support
Darden's argument for exclusion. In general, lawyers are only al
lowed to use prior statements to attack a witness' credibility under
certain narrowly-prescribed circumstances, and it was questionable
whether the defense had met these requirements with respect to
Fuhrman.74 Darden, therefore, was justified in arguing that the
I return to the difference in the media's reaction to the two cases in a related context
below. See infra note 99.
70.

See Russell, supra note

l, at 7P>7 n.58 {describing the exchange).

71. Compare id. at 7P>7 (suggesting that "Darden undennined his own 'colorblind' lawyer
ing strategy" in the exchange) with id. at 788 (suggesting that lawyers like Darden who adopt
colorblind strategies "must deny the realities of racism in order to appear balanced and fair
in advancing the case of the client").
72.

See id.

at 789-90 (summarizing Darden's argument).

73. I argue below that Cochran's argument to the contrary was equally plausible.
infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.

See

74. In general, evidence that a person has a bad character trait (e.g., that Fuhrman is a
racist) is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in confonnity
with that bad trait (e.g., that Fuhrman consequently planted evidence to frame a black sus
pect). See CAL. R. Evm. 1101 ("[E]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her
character {whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion."); cf. FED. R. Evm. 404{a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confonnity therewith . . . . ").
There are two widely recognized exceptions to this rule. Frrst, certain kinds of prior bad
acts can be introduced to impeach a witness's truthfulness. See CAL. R. Evm. 780(e) {al
lowing evidence of a witness's character for honesty, veracity, or their opposites); accord
FED. R. Evm. 608. However, at the time that the defense first sought to cross-examine Fuhr
man on his use of racial epithets, Fuhrman had not yet denied using these words either during
his direct testimony, or, so far as I am aware, on any other occasion. As a result, the defense
could not argue - at least at that point in the proceedings - that evidence of Fuhrman's
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Fuhrman statements should be excluded even if
were he the
judge - he would have been inclined to let the statements into
evidence.
-

Of course, the strength of Darden's argument for excluding
Fuhrman's past racist statements would have been largely beside
the point if Darden believed that the Simpson prosecution was fun
damentally racist or that Fuhrman had planted the bloody glove.
The claim that Darden "sold out" the black community when he
argued against admitting evidence of Fuhrman's past racism implic
itly rests on something like one or the other of these premises. Un
less the Simpson prosecution was deeply infected by racism, it is
difficult to conceive of why the black community would have had
an interest in stopping a black prosecutor from making a factually
and legally plausible argument in favor of Simpson's guilt.
Needless to say, Darden himself never entertained any such res
ervations. To the contrary, Darden continues to express strong be
lief in Simpson's guilt.75 Apart from Darden's subjective belief,
there is not a shred of credible evidence to support the charge that
the decision to prosecute Simpson was racist, or that Darden or any
other prosecutor had persuasive evidence that police planted or

prior racist statements proved he was dishonest for denying that he made them. Therefore,
Darden had a very strong argument that questions about Fuhnnan's prior use of the N-word
did not go to his veracity, because using racial slurs or even being a racist does not necessarily
make one untruthful
Second, evidence of a witness's character or actions can be introduced to prove "the exist
ence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive." CAL. R. Evm. 780(f); accord FED.
R. Evm. 404(b). Therefore, the defens·e had a good argument that Fuhnnan's hatred for
blacks (as evidenced by his use of racial slurs, particularly with respect to black men who date
white women) established a motive for planting evidence, or, alternatively, demonstrated
Fuhnnan's bias against Simpson. However, the problem with this argument was that at the
time that Fuhnnan initially took the stand, the defense had very little evidence corroborating
their theory of a police conspiracy to frame Simpson. Nor did they have any evidence linking
Fuhnnan's alleged racism to the perfonnance of his official duties. (At this point, the Laura
McKinny tapes had not yet surfaced. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.) As a result,
Darden had a strong argument that claims about motive or bias were too speculative to
justify the substantial danger that introducing Fuhnnan's prior statements would divert the
jury's attention from evidence relating to Simpson's guilt or innocence. See CAL. R. EVIo.
352 (authorizing the trial judge to exclude evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the . . . danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury"); see also People v. Kronemyer, 234 Cal. Rptr. 442, 460-61 (Cal. a. App. 1987)
(affirming the exclusion of the cross-examination of a witness regarding his twenty-year
friendship with an interested party because the allegation of bias was too speculative).
Taken as a whole, these evidentiary principles provide strong support for Darden's argu
ment that the defense should have been prohibited from cross-examining Fuhnnan about his
prior use of racial slurs during his initial appearance on the stand. Once Judge Ito allowed the
defense to pursue this line of questioning - and once Fuhnnan emphatically denied under
oath that he had made· any such statements in the last ten years - the argument for admissi
bility changed dramatically. I return to this issue below. See infra note 76.

75. See

CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN WITII JESS WALTER, IN CONTEMPT 4

(1996).
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otherwise manufactured evidence at the time Fuhrman initially
testified.76
This does not mean that everything that Darden said during his
exchange with Cochran was justified by the legitimate demands of
his professional role. For example, Darden accused Cochran of
'"play[ing] the race card"' when he sought to introduce Fuhrm.an's
past racist statements.77 For the reasons set out below, given the
merits of Cochran's argument for introducing Fuhrm.an's state
ments, Darden's accusation was unfounded. Darden, one suspects,
was fully aware of the plausibility of Cochran's position. His at
tempt to level this explosive charge against Cochran therefore ap
pears to have been little more than a smokescreen to divert Judge
Ito's attention from the merits of Cochran's argument.78 By mak
ing this charge (unlike the rest of his argument about Fuhrman's
statements), Darden undermined rather than promoted the legal
system's commitment to evaluate the arguments of counsel (and
therefore the fate of the defendant) on the merits, not on the basis
of race. This brings me to the Cochran Conundrum.
2.

Reaffirming the Cochran Conundrum: Defining When and
How Race Should Matter

Russell defines the Cochran Conundrum as the set of obstacles
"encountered most frequently by Black lawyers who openly articu
late issues of racism as relevant to a particular case."79 Those who
do so, Russell asserts, risk being accused of "'playing the race card'
and therefore unfairly skewing reasonable debate on the 'merits' of
76. It is a much closer question whether Darden was correct in opposing the introduc
tion of the McKinny tapes. Laura McKinny was an aspiring screenwriter who conducted
tape-recorded interviews with Fuhrman as part of her research for a screenplay. In the
course of these interviews, Fuhrman not only used the N-word dozens of times, but he also
boasted that in the past he had planted evidence in order to convict black defendants. By the
time the dispute over these tapes erupted, there was no longer any question that Fuhrman
was a perjurer as well as a racist, so lack of corroboration was not an issue. Moreover, these
tapes contained specific indications that Fuhrman either did or would plant evidence to
frame black defendants, particularly those seen in the company of white women. A prosecu
tor's duty is to seek justice, not just to obtain convictions. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFES
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1995) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate."). Given this responsibility, it is far from certain
that a prosecutor in Darden's position was ethically required to seek to exclude evidence so
directly relevant to the credibility of such a key prosecution witness.
77.

See Russell, supra note 1, at 789 (quoting Darden).

78. It is possible that Darden simply wanted to impress on Judge Ito that the Simpson

defense was attempting to use Fuhrman as a means of distracting the jury's attention from
the evidence pointing to Simpson's guilt. Criminal defense lawyers, of course, routinely at
tempt to shift the jury's attention away from evidence harmful to their client's case.
Although Darden was certainly entitled to call Cochran on this standard defense tactic, he
should have done so in a way that did not suggest that Cochran's attempt to introduce Fuhr
man's statements was outside the bounds of acceptable advocacy.
79. Russell, supra note 1, at 788.
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a case by insisting that racism is a relevant issue in an otherwise
'raceless' context. "SO
This definition, although illuminating in many contexts, is never
theless too narrow. It is quite possible to play the race cardst illegit
imately in circumstances where race is clearly acknowledged by
everyone to be a factor in the case. In the not too distant past, such
blatant appeals to race - and more specifically to white racism were quite common.82 For example, in 1922, a white prosecutor im
plored a jury to convict a black man under a liquor law by asking,
"Are you gentlemen going to believe that nigger sitting over there
. . . in preference to the testimony of [white] deputies?"83 More
recently, in a similar interracial sexual assault case tried in 1978, a
white prosecutor attacked the credibility of the defendant's consent
defense by arguing " 'that the average white woman abhors any
thing of this type in nature that has to do with a black man. It is
innate within us.' "84 Certainly these blatant appeals to racist senti
ment in racially charged cases constitute playing the race card.
By the same token, one can play the race card by insinuating
that a reasonable argument that race is relevant to a particular case
is actually being deployed only to promote illegitimate racial soli
darity. As I argued above, I believe that Darden's allegation that
Cochran was playing the race card when he initially sought to intro
duce Fuhrman's prior racist remarks falls into this category.
What unites the multiple ways in which one can play the race
card is not that a lawyer has introduced race into an otherwise race
less proceeding. Instead, what makes each of these uses of race
troubling is the extent to which they undermine the legal system's
ability to make good on its aspirational norm that race should not
determine a defendant's guilt or innocence.ss
80.

Id.

at 789.

81. Because she focuses on how the master narrative of race produces unjustified claims
of playing the race card against black attorneys, Russell does not articulate the circumstances
in which this charge is properly applied. It is this focus, I believe, that causes her to overlook
the quite different examples of playing the race card discussed below. See infra notes 82·85
and accompanying text. In addition, Russell's focus on unjustified allegations of playing the
race card frequently makes it unclear whether she intends to endorse the pejorative connota
tions generally associated with this term or to highlight the difficulty black attorneys encoun
ter when they attempt to raise legitimate racial issues. In order to avoid this ambiguity, I use
the phrase solely in its pejorative capacity.
82. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Prosecutor's Appeal in Criminal Case to Racial,
Nationa� or Religious Prejudice as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, Reversal, or Vacation of
Sentence - Modern Cases, 70 A.L.R. 411i 664 (1989).
83. James v. State, 92 So. 909 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922).
84. Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F2d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1978).
85. Racism, for example, in cases involving police brutality or hate crimes, may legiti
mately affect the determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence. This is another example
of the important differences among different kinds of "race cases." See supra note 59.
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Given this definition, neither of the two instances where
Cochran most often has been accused of "playing the race card"
supports this serious charge. As I mentioned above, Cochran made
a plausible - although certainly not dispositive - argument that
the defense should be allowed to cross-examine Fuhrman about his
prior racist statements even in the absence of significant cor
roborating evidence.86 Although the weight of precedent was
against him, Cochran made a reasonable argument that the jury was
entitled to know about Fuhrman's racist views when weighing the
credibility of his testimony, including . the testimony that he found
the second glove on Simpson's property.87
In essence, Cochran argued that a public law enforcement offi
cial's racist comments ought to be treated more like false state
ments under oath (which are admissible to impeach a witness's
credibility) than like general allegations of bad character (which are
not admissible). After all, Fuhrman took an oath "to serve and pro
tect" all of Los Angeles' citizens, an oath that is at least rendered
problematic by evidence that he regards some of those citizens as
less human than others. Moreover, Cochran's claim that the black
jurors would be able to evaluate Fuhrman's racism without losing
their objectivity was also reasonable.88

Once again, the point is not whether from our neutral perspec
tive we find Cochran's argument convincing. So long as his argu
ments were factually and legally reasonable, Cochran was obligated
as Simpson's lawyer to present them in their best light, just as
Darden was equally obligated by his role to present reasonable ar
guments for excluding Fuhrman's prior racist statements.89
Nor is it clear that Cochran played the race card in his closing
argument. Cochran urged jurors to "send a message" by their ver
dict that racist police tactics would no longer be tolerated. Despite
86. See supra note 74.
87. See CAL. R. Evm. 780(t) (allowing evidence of the "bias, interest, or other motive" of
any witness); see also GRAHAM c. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 29798 (1978) (discussing impeachment of a witness by exposing her bias concerning the outcome
of a case).

88. See Russell, supra note 1, at 787 n.58 [29-30] (quoting Cochran as responding to
Darden by arguing "[i]t's demeaning to our jury . . . to say that African-Americans who've
lived under oppression for 200-plus years in this country cannot work in the mainstream"
(quoting Kenneth B. Noble, Issue of Racism Erupts in Simpson Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1995, at A7)).
89. In light of the fact that criminal defendants have the right to challenge each and every
element of the state's case regardless of their factual guilt, it is doubtful whether Cochran (in
contrast to Darden) would have been prevented from seeking to introduce Fuhrman's state
ments even if Cochran knew that Simpson had committed the murders. The point, however,
is largely of academic interest since Cochran reports that he has never wavered in his belief
in Simpson's innocence. See JOHNNIE L. CoCHRAN, JR. wrIH TIM RUTTEN, JOURNEY TO
JUSTICE (1996).
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the furor that Cochran's remarks have generated in the press,9o
Cochran's use of this rhetorical device is not unprecedented. To the
contrary, prosecutors frequently ask jurors to convict defendants of
serious crimes in order to send a message to both law abiding and
lawless citizens that criminal activity will not be tolerated.91
It is possible to object to this standard bit of prosecution rheto
ric with the same fury that greeted Cochran's argument. Both
Cochran and the prosecutor can be portrayed as inviting the jury to
disregard the particular facts of the case and base their decision on
some more general community interest: deterring either police mis
conduct or future criminal acts.92 This, however, is not the way in
which judges and the general public seem to regard the prosecutors'
standard send a message argument. Instead, the prosecutor is inter
preted as simply reminding jurors of their power to act as the con
science of the community in letting criminals know that guilty
defendants will be severely punished for their crimes.93 One can
interpret Cochran's closing argument94 as asking jurors to play a
similar role by "sending a message" to law enforcement officials
that racist or otherwise inappropriate police tactics create reason
able doubt about a defendant's guilt,9s
90. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 1, at 788 n.59.
91. See James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When We
Ask Them to "Send a Message" with Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 570 (1995)
("(P]rosecutorial appeals to convict a defendant in order to 'send a message' to other
criminals, or to the community in general, that a certain crime 'will not be tolerated' in that
community . . . (have] been used in a striking number of reported cases . . . .").
92. See id. at 635-74 (arguing that appeals to send a message, whether offered by prosecu
tors or defense lawyers, should almost always be considered reversible error). Not everyone
agrees with this assessment. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice? 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 97 (1991) ("For every
commentator who concludes that prosecutors commit misconduct by appealing to emotion,
another can be found who suggests that arousing jurors is the role of summation.").
93. See Duane, supra note 91, at 622 ("[T]he 'majority rule' of law, which has been ac
cepted without question by every circuit to consider the question, is that requests for a jury to
send a message - like any other appeal to the jury to act as the 'conscience of the commu
nity' - are proper as long as they are [not] intended or calculated to inflame the jury . . . ").
94. Once again, by constructing this account of Cochran's argument, I do not mean to
suggest that these were his actual motives. As with Garcetti's decision to prosecute Simpson
in L.A. County, Cochran's motivations for employing the "send a message" argument were
undoubtedly complex. It is likely, as some of his critics have asserted, that Cochran hoped
that this argument would divert the jury's attention from evidence pointing to Simpson's
guilt. It is also possible that Cochran understood, or perhaps even intended, that some jurors
would take his remarks as an invitation to disregard evidence of Simpson's guilt. The same
claim, however, could be made about any tactic used by a defense lawyer when there is
strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. Nevertheless, so long as Cochran's argument falls
within the zone of legitimate advocacy, the fact that he may have offered it for the purpose of
helping his client escape punishment is insufficient to support the charge that he played the
race card.
95. Such an appeal rests on two closely related grounds. First, Cochran might have been
arguing that, because the police planted or tampered with some evidence in the case (accord
ing to the defense theory), the jury should have reasonable doubt about the trustworthiness
of the remaining evidence. In addition (or in the alternative), Cochran might have been
,
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To be sure, the message Cochran asked jurors to send is contro
versial.96 One can certainly take the position that racism (let alone
sloppy police work) does not invariably create reasonable doubt as
to a defendant's guilt. The fact that there are reasonable responses
to Cochran's position, however, does not render his argument
outside the boundaries of acceptable advocacy. As Simpson's law
yer, Cochran was entitled to raise all reasonable arguments on his
client's behalf. By asking the jurors to "send a message" about ra
cism and corruption inside the Los Angeles Police Department,
Cochran did not imply that the jury should disregard the evi
dence.97 To the contrary, the force of Cochran's claim comes from
evidence (according to the defense) of racism and corruption in this
case. Nor was Cochran's argument directed solely at black jurors.
Although it is likely that Cochran believed that black jurors might
on average be more sympathetic to this argument, his request that
jurors "send a message" about the dangers of allowing official cor
ruption to taint the trial process is one that ought to appeal to all
Americans regardless of race.98
Once again, one can certainly take the position that the jury's
only legitimate role is to find the facts, and that appeals by either
prosecutors or defense lawyers for juries to "send a message" serve
urging jurors to send a message to the government that certain kinds of governmental mis
conduct essentially forfeit the state's right to a conviction. This last sentiment finds support
in doctrines such as the exclusionary rule. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear,
the fact that strict application of this doctrine often results in guilty defendants being set free
is the price that must be paid to send a message to Jaw enforcement officials and to the public
at large that governmental misconduct will not be tolerated. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 659 (1961) Gustifying allowing guilty criminals to go free on the ground that "[n]othing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence").
96. Indeed, one court has taken the position that send a message arguments are more
objectionable when made by defense lawyers than when made by prosecutors. See United
States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding a trial judge's
instructions telling the jury to disregard defense counsel's appeal to "send a message" that
the government should not make deals with convicted felons, because such an argument
"urged the jury to acquit . . . on the basis of extraneous public policy considerations"). As
one commentator has noted, it is "odd . . . that federal appeals courts have so consistently
approved such prosecutorial comments at the same time they have denied defendants the
liberty to make nearly identical appeals." Duane, supra note 91, at 581-82. I would go fur
ther. Given the strong presumption in favor of protecting the rights of the accused, it is hard
to fathom why prosecutors should be able to call on jurors to act as the "conscience of the
community" while defense lawyers are denied the same right.
97. Cochran's argument is therefore distinguishable from Paul Butler's contention that
black jurors should nullify the convictions of nonviolent black offenders even in the absence
of any evidence that the prosecution of this particular black defendant was in any way tainted
by racism or official corruption. See Butler, supra note 24.

98. As Justice Brandeis said more than a half-century ago: "Our government is the po
tent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its exam
ple
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a Jaw unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
.

.

•
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to distort the trial process. Given existing advocacy standards, how
ever, the furor over Cochran's argument is unfounded. Indeed, as
Russell notes, those claiming that Cochran was not entitled to im
plore the jury to "send a message" are actually the ones playing the
race card by seeking to delegitimate Cochran without having to
meet the merits of his arguments.99
The two examples most often cited by Cochran's critics, there
fore, fail to substantiate the charge that he overstepped the bound
ary between legitimate arguments about the importance of race and
playing the race card. There is, however, at least one example
where Cochran attempted to use race to obtain an illegitimate ad
vantage. Ironically, it involves neither Fuhrman nor the black ju
rors, but Darden. As I indicated above, Cochran opposed Darden's
addition to the prosecution team on the ground that the prosecu
tion was attempting to gain an unfair advantage because of
Darden's race. As I argued, Cochran seems correct in surmising
that Darden's race was a relevant (if not dispositive) criterion for
his addition to the team.100
Nevertheless, this does not make Darden's selection illegitimate
from the standpoint of the normative goals of the legal system.
There were, as I argued, legitimate reasons for adding a black pros
ecutor with Darden's experience to the team - reasons that made
it more, not less, likely that Simpson would receive a fair trial.101
99. See Russell, supra note 1, at 792 (arguing that denunciations of playing the race card
themselves "function as trumps" by implying that talking about race is never meritorious and
is always little more than lawyerly gamesmanship). The stark contrast between the fierce
reaction in the media to Cochran's send a message summation on the one hand, and the lack
of reaction to arguably similar closing arguments made in Simpson's civil trial on the other,
supports the conclusion that accusations of playing the race card tend to distort or ignore the
merits of lawyers' arguments. In his impassioned summation to the jury, Goldman family
attorney Daniel Petrocelli made an explicit send a message plea by shouting to the jurors that
"you must send [Simpson] a message as loud as humanly possible, so he can hear it on
whatever golf course he is hiding out on right now." Adam Pertrnan, Plaintiffs Laud Simp
son's Marketability, Assets; Jurors Deliberate on Punitive Award, Break for Weekend, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 8, 1997, at A3.
Granted, one can certainly distinguish Petrocelli's use of the send a message trope from
Cochran's, because the former was directed at Simpson himself, whereas the latter spoke to
the police and the broader community. However, the fact that Petrocelli's argument has
been greeted with silence - or even praise - in the media despite the fact that it arguably
invited the jury, in the words of a New York Times editorial condemning Cochran's send-a
message argument, "to look beyond the specifics of the O.J. case and send a broader
message," Race Cards and Rebuttals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at Al8, once again speaks
volumes about the way race colors perceptions of this case.
100. To say that Darden's race was one reason he was added to the team does not imply
that it was the only reason. After all, there were many blacks in the prosecutor's office.
Obviously, there are other reasons - most likely relating to Darden's talents as a prosecutor
- that caused Garcetti to select Darden over other available black prosecutors.
101. Ironically, Cochran's own argument underscores at least one of these potential bene
fits. Cochran argued that Darden was being added to the team " 'just to show that if a black
prosecutor sees O.J. guilty, he is being judged by the evidence at hand not for some deep
seated bias.' " Russell, supra note 1, at 789 (quoting Maxwell, supra note 41). This, of
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Nor can Cochran claim that the norms of zealous advocacy required
him to attack the integrity of the prosecutor's staffing decision (and
by implication Darden's personal credibility). If anything, the ca
nons of professional responsibility frown on ad hominem attacks on
a lawyer's fitness to engage in a particular professional role.102 Fi
nally, Cochran's position seems tainted by hypocrisy, since it is
likely that Simpson and Robert Shapiro took Cochran's race into
account in deciding to hire him to be the lead lawyer in the case.
As a result, although we might excuse Cochran for pointing out the
obvious when he noted that Darden was being added in part be
cause he was black, Cochran's attempt to keep Darden off the case
ultimately accomplished little except to reinforce the kind of divi
sive racial rhetoric that Russell rightly condemns.103
III.

CONCLUSION: TowARD A RACE CONSCIOUS AccoUNT
LEGAL ETHICS
-

OF

Russell concludes her important Essay by urging black attorneys
to move beyond the narrow categories of "sellouts" and "race
cards." Her goal is to help African-American lawyers move toward
a race-conscious account of lawyering capable of providing the
"critically needed latitude" they need to serve their communities
through their chosen profession.104 I share this objective. As the
door of opportunity slowly creaks open for a few blacks - while
countless others remain mired in poverty - it is critical that black
lawyers find creative ways to balance their competing commitments
to their communities, to their jobs, and to their unique aspirations
as human beings.105 This task, however, cannot be left to the black
bar alone. White lawyers also must learn how to talk about the
reality of race openly and intelligently without undermining the
legal system's fundamental commitment to the norm that race
should not affect the determination of a defendant's guilt or
innocence.
This will surely be a difficult task. However, we should not de
spair that it is Sisyphean.106 Sixty years ago, Charles Hamilton
course, is exactly what we want the jury to do: judge Simpson's guilt or innocence according
to the evidence, not on the basis of some deep-seated bias. To the extent that Darden's
presence made that result more likely, it furthered, rather than undermined, the legitimate
goals of the justice system.
102. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-37 (1980) ("A lawyer
should not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel.").
103.
104.

See Russell, supra note l,
Id. at 794.

at 793.

105. For a detailed account of the relationship among these three moral spheres, see
David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles, 56 Mn. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
106. But see Russell, supra note 1, at 792 (arguing that "race-conscious lawyering [is] a
Sisyphean task"). Given her call for further reflection and dialogue, I do not believe that
Russell considers the task truly impossible.
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Houston and Thurgood Marshall created an entirely new approach
to lawyering, one that was as radical in their day as the idea of race
conscious lawyering is in our own.107 Not only did Houston and
Marshall create a winning strategy to topple de jure segregation,
they also paved the way for the modem public interest law
movement.10s
In constructing the country's first legal campaign to achieve so
cial justice, however, Houston and Marshall never lost sight of the
legitimate normative constraints on their activities imposed by their
professional roles and by the norms of the legal system more gener
ally. As we work to fashion a new model of race-conscious lawyer
ing for the twenty-first century, we must do the same.

107. See Wilkins, Social Engineers, supra note 28.
108. See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 209 (1976), quoted in MARK V. TusHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 144 (1987).

